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In re Sanders and the Resurrection of 
Stanley v. Illinois 
Josh Gupta-Kagan* 
A child’s mother abuses her, state child welfare authorities file a petition 
in family court seeking custody of the child, and the mother admits her abuse. 
The child’s father lives apart from the mother, has shared custody of his child, 
and is not responsible for the mother’s abuse. The father seeks custody of the 
child. The father has not been proven unfit, so one would expect the court to 
grant the father custody. But under the “One-Parent Doctrine,” adjudicating the 
mother alone unfit gives the family court authority to place the child in foster 
care, severely invading the father and child’s constitutionally protected 
relationship. 
As the Michigan Supreme Court said in its recent In re Sanders decision, 
“[m]erely describing the [one-parent] doctrine foreshadows its constitutional 
weakness.”1 Parents have the well-established constitutional right to the care, 
custody, and control of their children.2 So long as an unwed father has seized 
his opportunity interest in being a parent, he has the same rights as a mother.3 
And, as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Stanley v. Illinois in 1972, the State 
cannot constitutionally deprive a parent of custody, or make “the children 
suffer from [the] uncertainty and dislocation” inherent in foster care, without 
first proving the parent unfit.4 If the State thinks a parent is unfit, the State 
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1. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (2014). 
2. Troxel v. Granville, 430 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
3. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
4. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-49 (1972). 
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should file a petition so alleging and prove its allegations at a trial. 
This Essay begins by reviewing Stanley v. Illinois, and outlines how that 
foundational case originally recognized parental rights in foster care cases yet 
became understood primarily as a private adoption case. Second, it explains 
how, simultaneously, family courts developed the One-Parent Doctrine and a 
related doctrine making it difficult to transfer custody of a child from an 
abusive or neglectful parent in one state to a non-offending parent in another. 
Both doctrines violate Stanley by allowing the State to take custody of children 
without ever proving parental unfitness. Cases adopting these doctrines literally 
ignore Stanley. Third, this Essay argues that this trend may be changing with In 
re Sanders, which resuscitated Stanley’s core holding in foster care cases. 
Finally, it suggests how Sanders and a revived Stanley can be an important tool 
to improve family court practice and better determine when State custody is 
necessary to protect children. 
I. 
STANLEY V. ILLINOIS: THE FOSTER CARE CASE THAT BECAME A PRIVATE 
ADOPTION CASE 
The facts the U.S. Supreme Court reported in Stanley v. Illinois were 
sparse: Peter and Joan Stanley cohabited but did not marry and had three 
children. After Joan died, the State of Illinois took custody of the couple’s two 
youngest children under a state law (later invalidated by the Supreme Court) 
that presumed unwed fathers unfit.5 
The full facts were more complicated. The State initially filed a petition 
alleging that Peter Stanley had neglected his two youngest children.6 Stanley 
was an alcoholic7 who had already lost custody of his oldest child, who had 
alleged that “Stanley assaulted her and made sexual advances after the mother’s 
death in 1969.”8 The juvenile court concluded he had neglected her.9 But rather 
than prove Stanley unfit, the State amended its petition to rely on a statute that 
presumed his children dependent because he had not married their  
mother.10  The Supreme Court declared this “procedure by presumption”11 
unconstitutional and held that due process requires states to provide parents 
with hearings on their fitness before removing their children.12 
 
5.  Id. at 646. 
6.  Petition, In re Stanley, 69JO4773 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County May 21, 1969) (on file with 
author). 
7.  Interview with Patrick Murphy, counsel for Peter Stanley (Apr. 27, 2014). 
8.  Joseph Sjostrom, Unwed Dad Loses Right to Children, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 14, 1973, 
at A16. 
9.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, In re Peter Stanley, No. 69JO4773 (May 16, 1969); 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, In re Kimberly Stanley, No. 69JO4773 (May 16, 1969) (oral 
arguments for both cases were combined into the same transcript) (on file with the author.). 
10. Id. at 3. 
11. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. 
12. Id. at 648. 
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Stanley was a foster care case, not a private family law case—the State 
acted to take Stanley’s children and make them wards of the State.13 Justice 
Byron White’s opinion unfortunately uses the passive voice in a key phrase, 
holding that Stanley had a right to a hearing on his parental fitness “before his 
children were taken from him.”14 But it is clear on the facts that a state agency 
did the taking. This holding should have formed an uncontroversial baseline: 
the State must prove parents unfit before removing their children. 
Stanley, however, was twisted into something both more and less than the 
actual case required. Courts both applied it broadly to private adoption cases 
that were not at issue in Stanley and ignored it in child protection cases even 
though that was the case’s original context. Just seven weeks after the Supreme 
Court decided Stanley, the Illinois Supreme Court applied it to a private 
newborn adoption.15 The court described Stanley as broadly holding “that the 
interests of the father of an illegitimate child are no different from those of 
other parents.” 16  Resulting media attention focused on how Stanley (as 
interpreted) “puts adoptions in legal limbo.” 17  This was not a necessary 
interpretation; newborn adoption cases like Slawek involve disagreements 
between a mother who believes adoption is best for the child and a father who 
disagrees, not State invasions of family integrity. And the U.S. Supreme Court 
had recognized the powerful constitutional interest “of a man in the children he 
has sired and raised.”18 Stanley did not resolve whether an unwed father who 
had not raised his children had such rights, let alone the even more challenging 
question of what rights an unwed father may have regarding a newborn whose 
mother wishes to relinquish the baby for adoption. 
Future litigation centered on unwed fathers’ rights in various adoption 
scenarios. Stanley thus became the first in a quartet of Supreme Court cases 
about unwed fathers and adoptions in private family law cases; none of the 
subsequent cases involved State actions to place children in foster care.19 The 
academy went along, treating Stanley as the earliest of this quartet, rather than 
as a leading case about State intervention in family life.20 Casebooks present 
 
13. Id. at 646. 
14. Id. at 649. 
15. Slawek v. Covenant Children’s Home, 52 Ill.2d 20, 22 (1972). The Supreme Court decided 
Stanley on April 3, 1972, and the Illinois Supreme Court decided Slawek on May 26, 1972. 
16. Id. 
17. Carol Kleiman, Ruling Puts Adoptions in Legal Limbo, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 4, 1972, 
at § 2-17. 
18. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added). 
19. The next three cases of the quartet all addressed a biological father’s challenge to the 
adoption of his child by the child’s mother’s new husband, also known as a stepparent adoption. 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 381 (1979); Lehr 
v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249 (1983). 
20.  See, e.g. Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How To Determine When 
Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 157-58 
(2006); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 
ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 758-60 (1999). 
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Stanley as a case about adoption, when it really involved a father fighting the 
child protection agency for custody.21 
II. 
THE ONE-PARENT DOCTRINE: IGNORING STANLEY IN FOSTER CARE CASES 
Meanwhile, in child protection cases around the country, the One-Parent 
Doctrine emerged, and Stanley strangely vanished from courts’ analyses.22 As 
Vivek Sankaran has established, “[t]he overwhelming majority of states 
currently maintain child welfare systems that disregard the constitutional rights 
of non-offending parents.” 23  Courts held that because they could take 
jurisdiction based on one parent’s abuse, they could also infringe upon the 
other parent’s rights.24 
At trial in Sanders, the State relied on that doctrine to deny a father his 
presumptive right to custody and did not try to prove him unfit. Tammy 
Sanders gave birth to her son, C., who had drugs in his system at birth. Acting 
on a petition from the child protection agency, the family court placed C. in the 
custody of his father, Lance Laird, who was raising an older child also born to 
Sanders. The agency then amended the petition to make allegations against 
Laird as well, and won a temporary ruling granting itself custody of the 
children pre-trial. Sanders pleaded no contest to the allegations that she was an 
unfit parent, but Laird insisted on a trial regarding the State’s fitness 
allegations. Rather than prove its allegations at a trial, the State dismissed its 
allegations against Laird and convinced the court at a post-disposition motions 
hearing to keep the children in foster care without ever obtaining a court 
adjudication that Laird was unfit. 
The State of Michigan took the same short cut that the State of Illinois had 
taken four and half decades earlier in Stanley. Just as Illinois had legitimate 
concerns about Peter Stanley’s parenting, Michigan had reasons to question 
Laird’s fitness as a parent. The State alleged Laird tested positive for cocaine 
use, was on probation for a domestic violence conviction, had violated a court 
order to keep the neglectful mother away from the children, and had been 
 
21. See e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, ET AL., CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 665 (5th ed. 2014) (placing Stanley in a chapter on “Adoption” rather than “Abuse and 
Neglect” or “Foster Care”). 
22. The history of the One-Parent Doctrine’s emergence, why it was not challenged in family 
court until the 1990s and 2000s, and why courts endorsed it in spite of Stanley requires analysis 
beyond the scope of this short Essay. For present purposes it suffices to note that, in 2014, many 
family courts operate under a pre-Stanley mindset. The response to claims that fathers who have been 
involved in their children’s lives and have not abused or neglected them should be treated as parents 
with protected rights is “we don’t do it that way in juvenile court.” Cyrenthia D. Shaw, Creating a 
New Norm: Engaging Fathers through Direct Representation in Child in Need of Protection or 
Services Action, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1157 (2014). 
23. Vivek Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for the 
Constitutional Rights of Non-offending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 70 (2009). Sankaran was 
Laird’s counsel in Sanders. 
24. See id. at 70-73 (collecting and discussing cases). 
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arrested for selling cocaine (and, at the time of the appellate decision, was 
incarcerated after having been convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than 
five hundred grams of cocaine).25 Laird denied the allegations of unfitness and, 
like Stanley, objected to the State taking custody of his children. Just as Illinois 
decided to drop its neglect allegations against Stanley, Michigan chose to 
dismiss allegations of unfitness against Laird, and declined to file a new 
petition against him. As in Stanley, the State’s decision avoided a trial’s 
rigorous testing of the evidence against Laird.26 And the trial court kept the 
child out of Laird’s custody because of the One-Parent Doctrine.27 
This One-Parent Doctrine fails to adequately address the Stanley holding. 
The Michigan case announcing the One-Parent Doctrine, overturned in 
Sanders, did not even cite or discuss Stanley.28 One-parent cases in other states 
similarly ignore Stanley.29 
III. 
THE ONE-PARENT DOCTRINE’S COUSIN—APPLYING THE INTERSTATE 
COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN TO PARENTS 
Courts’ habit of ignoring Stanley and adopting flimsy logic extends to a 
close cousin to the One-Parent Doctrine—the Interstate Compact on the 
Placement of Children (ICPC). The ICPC is an agreement incorporated into 
state statutes governing the transfer of children across state lines for placement 
in foster or pre-adoptive homes.30 Envision the same basic fact pattern—one 
unfit parent and one fit parent—but put the parents in different states (not 
uncommon in our highly mobile nation with many metropolitan areas 
straddling state lines). In such cases, state agencies routinely argue that the 
ICPC applies to a non-offending parent, and prevents children from living with 
him until he proves his fitness to a social worker.31 This application follows 
guidance first issued in 1976, which failed to discuss or cite Stanley just four 
years after it was decided.32 Such arguments have led to children remaining in 
 
25. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 553 n.23 (Markman, J., dissenting). 
26. Id. at 527. 
27. Id. 
28. In re C.R., 646 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). C.R. did not cite Stanley a single time. 
29. The dissent cites three such cases—In re A.R., 330 S.W.3d 858 (Mo. App. 2011), In re 
C.R., 843 N.E.2d 1188 (Ohio 2006), and In re Amber G., 554 N.W.2d 142 (Neb. 1996). Sanders, 852 
N.W.2d at 544 n.11 (Markman, J., dissenting). None of these cases cites or seeks to distinguish 
Stanley. The only citation to Stanley is on a different point. Amber G., 554 N.W.2d at 150 (citing 
Stanley for the difference between custody or guardianship and adoption). 
30. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 4-1422 (2001) (authorizing the District of Columbia mayor to enter 
a compact endorsed by the legislature). Article III(a) of the ICPC limits its scope to foster care and 
adoptive placements. Id. The ICPC’s full text is also available at http://www.aphsa.org/content/ 
AAICPC/en/ICPCArticle.html.  
31. Vivek Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents 
Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L & POL’Y REV. 63, 65–66 
(2006). 
32. ICPC Secretariat Opinion No. 32 (Sept. 8, 1976), reprinted in AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. 
ASS’N, 1 COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS MANUAL 3.71, 3.71 (2002); ICPC Secretariat Opinion No. 34 
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foster care because, for example, a social worker deemed a two-bedroom home 
too small for the father, his mother, and the child.33 
The States’ argument in these ICPC cases is weak,34 and directly contrary 
to Stanley. It deprives a presumptively fit parent of custody without any finding 
or hearing on fitness as required by Stanley. It requires the parent to prove to 
social workers in his state that he can raise his child. It then applies the wrong 
standard to this determination—whether living in parental custody serves the 
“interests of the child”35 rather than the constitutional fitness standard under 
Stanley. And if the social worker decides that the parental custody does not 
serve a child’s best interests, there is no mechanism to force the State to prove 
that proposition at a trial.36 
Despite these arguments’ weaknesses, at least eight state courts have 
upheld application of the ICPC against parents who the State did not allege or 
prove to have abused or neglected their children or to be otherwise unfit.37 
These courts’ analysis rests on paternalistic assumptions directly contrary to the 
constitutional presumption that custody with fit parents serves children’s 
interests: “Once a court has legal custody of a child, it would be negligent to 
relinquish that child to an out-of-state parent without some indication that the 
parent is able to care for the child appropriately.”38 These cases do not find an 
exception to Stanley, they simply ignore it. None of the eight cases even 
mentions Stanley. 
IV. 
IN RE SANDERS: LEARNING AND APPLYING STANLEY’S LESSONS 
After the trial court applied the One-Parent Doctrine and denied his 
request for custody of his children, Lance Laird appealed to the Michigan 
 
(1976), reprinted in AM. PUB. HUMAN SERVS. ASS’N, 1 COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS MANUAL 3.71, 
3.71 (2002); see also Sankaran, supra note 31, at 73 & n.47 (describing how Secretariat opinions 
expanded the ICPC’s reach to include parents). 
33. In re D.-F.M., 236 P.3d 961, 963 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). The trial court overruled this 
action, and placed the child with the father. That decision was upheld on appeal. Id. at 963, 967. This 
outcome, like Sanders, may indicate a trend back towards the Stanley holding.  
34. The ICPC provides that it applies to state agencies sending children across state lines “for 
placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption.” ICPC Article III(a), available at 
http://www.aphsa.org/content/AAICPC/en/ICPCArticle.html; see also, e.g., D.C. Code § 4-1422 
(2001) (codified adoption of the ICPC). Living with a parent is, by definition, neither foster care nor 
“preliminary to a possible adoption,” so under the plain terms of the ICPC, it does not apply to parents. 
35. Id. at art. III(4). 
36. Sankaran, supra note 23, at 84–86. 
37. Faison v. Capozello, 50 A.D. 3d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008); Green v. Div. of Family 
Servs., 864 A.2d 921 (Del. 2004); H.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 838 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2003); Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Leonardo, 22 P.3d 513 (Ariz. 2001); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds 
Co. DHS, 771 So.2d 907 (Miss. 2000); D.S.S. v. Clay County Dep’t of Human Res., 755 So. 2d 584 
(Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Adoption of Warren, 693 N.E.2d 1021 (Mass. 1998); see also State ex rel. Juv. 
Dep’t of Clackamas Co. v. Smith, 811 P.2d 145, 147 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (providing in dicta that 
“[t]he compact does apply to a child who is sent to another state for placement with parents or 
relatives, when someone other than a parent or relative makes the placement”) (emphasis in original). 
38. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Benway, 745 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
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Supreme Court. That Court relied on the Stanley principles and declared the 
One-Parent Doctrine unconstitutional.39 
The Michigan Supreme Court did not articulate new ideas. The concept 
that the State must allege and prove a parent unfit before denying him custody 
has been a well-established principle of constitutional law since Stanley. 
Rather, Sanders’s importance is that it resurrects Stanley. The Sanders 
majority cites Stanley twenty-two times, including two block quotes. Even the 
Sanders dissent acknowledges that Stanley requires a hearing on fitness, and 
disagrees only about the type of hearing required.40 Sanders’s reliance on 
Stanley’s core principles is remarkable because child welfare agencies and 
family courts have often ignored those principles in the decades since the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Stanley. Sanders is an important decision for the child 
welfare system in Michigan and nationally because it challenges the nearly 
universally accepted One-Parent Doctrine, and insists on basic due process 
protections before the State invades the fundamental right of family integrity. 
V. 
SANDERS AND STANLEY AS TOOLS TO REFORM FAMILY COURT CULTURE 
The risk of horrific abuse to children very likely leads some courts to 
ignore constitutional rulings and authorize legally unjustified interventions in 
family life. Family court judges and lawyers form a cohesive decision-making 
group, somewhat separated from other courts, and socially distinct from the 
overwhelmingly poor, poorly educated, and minority families who come before 
them.41 These judges and lawyers are charged with the emotionally daunting 
task of protecting children from abuse or neglect. Conditions are thus ripe for 
groupthink.42 Add in large caseloads, limited accountability via public criticism 
or appellate review, cognitive biases hardwired into human brains, and family 
court decisions too often rely on mental short cuts rather than rigorous legal 
reasoning.43 
The unmistakably gendered element to the One-Parent Doctrine (and its 
ICPC cousin) contributes to these mental short cuts. Typically, when the State 
intervenes to remove a child from the primary custodial parent who is unfit, 
that parent is the mother.44 Non-offending parents in these cases are generally 
fathers, and, given the demographics of families brought before family courts, 
 
39. In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 527 (2014). 
40. Id. at 554 (Markman, J., dissenting). 
41. Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional 
Culture of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 72–77 (2010). 
42. See generally id. (arguing that groupthink is a core element of family court culture). 
43. Matthew I. Fraidin, Decision-Making in Dependency Court: Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, 
and Accountability, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 913, 916–17 (2013). 
44. Melissa L. Breger, The (In)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court Proceedings, 36 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 555, 556–57 & 556 n.3 (2012). 
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often poor, unwed, and black (or other minority) fathers.45 Pious hand-wringing 
about the absence of such fathers in their children’s lives is all too common, 
and reflects a system that presumes fathers are absent or otherwise unavailable 
to raise children. Family court sex stereotypes surely harm mothers,46 but the 
harm extends to non-offending fathers. The dominant attitude towards fathers 
who do come forward to raise their children is one of disrespect and distrust. 
They are presumed irrelevant to the proceedings (or, at least, far less relevant 
than mothers). Rather than enjoying the constitutionally guaranteed 
presumption of fitness, these fathers are made to prove their fitness and are 
denied the right to a trial on any allegations against them. 
Child protection cases are, of course, emotionally difficult because of the 
weighty interest in protecting children from abuse. But, as the Sanders Court 
observed, a child has a strong legal interest both in avoiding maltreatment and 
“in remaining in his or her natural family environment.”47 We cannot know 
which interest trumps without first determining if the child’s parent is unfit. We 
hurt children by removing them from fit parents just as we hurt children by 
leaving them with unfit parents. Removals from parental custody and 
placement in temporary foster care, which often generate dislocations from 
school and a child’s entire family and social network, are anxiety producing,  
destabilizing, and even emotionally traumatizing. And occasionally, in cases 
similar to Sanders, removing children from fit parents leads to devastating 
harm to children. In a recent case out of St. Louis, authorities removed Shakur 
Knight from his drug-abusing mother but refused to release him to his fit father, 
because the father lived with the mother and refused to make Shakur’s mother 
(with whom he was raising other children) move out. Shakur was subsequently 
injured, and likely abused, in foster care, suffering multiple fractures, and 
retinal and subdural hemorrhaging.48 
The U.S. Constitution’s focus on parental fitness does not elevate parents’ 
rights over children’s. The Stanley court recognized this, writing that the State 
“spites its own articulated goals” in child protection when it removes children 
 
45. Although the causes are disputed, the existence of racial disproportionality in child 
protection cases is well established. See Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: 
The National Debate, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 215 (2013) (discussing the debate over the causes of racial 
disproportionality). Poverty correlates with increased likelihood of abuse or neglect. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, OFFICE OF PLANNING, RES., AND 
EVALUATION, FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4) 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 5-11–5-12 (2010). And single parenthood also strongly correlates with 
documented child maltreatment. Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting and 
Poverty, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 165, 186 (2000). Academics have long noted these demographic 
facts of child welfare cases. See e.g., Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A critique of 
Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 352 & n.59 (1999). 
46. Breger’s article is a relatively recent one in a long line of literature on stereotypes of 
mothers in child welfare cases. See Breger, supra note 44, at 556 & n.3 (collecting articles). 
47. In re Sanders 852 N.W.2d 524, 535 n.11 (2014).  
48. Nancy Cambria, Safety Cracks in Missouri Foster Policies, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Mar. 31, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/safety-cracks-in-
missouri-foster-policies/article_d2900118-de9c-5f22-abe3-33cce71104d8.html. 
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from fit parents.49 Robust procedures to determine parental fitness are essential 
elements of a legal system that respects children’s rights. 
When child protection authorities believe a parent is unfit and a threat to 
his or her child, Stanley requires a straightforward process to protect the child: 
the State must plead its allegations and prove them at trial.50 Efforts to evade 
this rule, like those tried by the State in Stanley and Sanders, are not 
acceptable. 
CONCLUSION 
Stanley adopted a formal legal rule that could be a strong antidote to the 
psychological and social pressures that can rush family courts to overly 
protective judgments. Sanders shows that courts are beginning, four decades 
later, to finally heed Stanley’s lesson in child protection cases. Although the 
One-Parent Doctrine continues to rule in some courts,51 other recent cases 
suggest a trend in favor of Stanley. For instance, the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals held earlier this year that non-offending parents are presumptively 
entitled to custody.52 Further, the most recent cases involving the ICPC have 
ruled against its application to parents.53 If this trend proves lasting, it will 
mark a new beginning for Stanley’s basic due process guarantee in child 
protection cases. 
 
49. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 653 (1972). 
50. The State argued that it was “unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine 
whether particular fathers are in fact unfit parents.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647. The Court rejected that 
argument, holding that due process requires a hearing on parental fitness. Id. at 649. 
51. See e.g., In re B.R., No. 13–388, 2014 WL 1657558 (Ver. Apr. 25, 2014). The Vermont 
Supreme Court rather lamely tried to distinguish Stanley, suggesting incorrectly that so long as the 
State did not presume unfitness that Stanley posed no obstacle. See id. at *6. 
52. See In re D.S., 88 A.3d 678, 681 (D.C. 2014); see also In re A.G., 295 P.3d 589, 590 (Nev. 
2013). 
53. See In re Emoni W., 48 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2012); In re D.F.-M., 236 P.3d 961 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2010); In re A.X.W., Docket No. 299622 2011 Mich. App. LEXIS 983 (May 26, 2011); In re Alexis 
O. 959 A.2d 176 (N.H. 2008). 
